

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

Project No. 2002C002

February 18, 2004

Final Report Follow-on Evaluation of the Defense Protective Service

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? Members of Congress; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Director, Administration and Management; personnel responsible for managing security at DoD facilities in the National Capital Region; and agencies that work with the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) should be interested in the issues discussed in this report.

Background. In 1997 and 1998, at congressional request,¹ we evaluated the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense Protective Service (DPS)² in accomplishing its law enforcement mission. Our resulting report, "Evaluation of the Defense Protective Service," May 14, 1999, included 27 recommendations regarding roles and responsibilities, organization and management, personnel, operations, and operations support. This follow-on evaluation reviewed progress made toward implementing our recommendations.

At the request of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, we expanded the follow-on evaluation that we had planned to include: an examination of DPS background check procedures and policies; National Crime Information Center (NCIC) checks for DPS officers hired since 1998, and private security guards employed at DoD sites under DPS cognizance; accountability of DPS weapons; and a determination of whether any missing DPS weapon had been used in a crime.

Results. Of the 27 recommendations, the Chief, DPS, fully implemented only five. Another was resolved without implementation. One of the five recommendations that were implemented resulted in a significant pay increase for DPS police officers. We identified problems related to implementation of the remaining 21 recommendations, some of which are critical to effective law enforcement operations. These included evidence accountability and weapons management (although we accounted for 100 percent of the current DPS weapons inventory).

¹ The Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives, requested the evaluation.

² At the time of our initial evaluation, DPS operated as a separate organizational entity under the direction and control of the Director, Administration and Management. In 2002, DoD created the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA), under the direction and control of the Director, Administration and Management. DPS was subsumed into PFPA. The DPS Operations Division (police operations) continued as DPS under PFPA. Recently, DPS was renamed the Pentagon Police Department (PPD). All references to DPS in this report apply to the new PPD.

In responding to Senator Grassley's concerns, no current or former DPS officer had a disqualifying criminal conviction, and we did not identify a current problem with DPS hiring practices; however, two private security guards under DPS cognizance had disqualifying criminal convictions. Additionally, two stolen DPS weapons were recovered during civilian police drug investigations.

Since the terrorists attack on the Pentagon in September 2001, DPS officers have stored their assigned Government weapons at their residences, which is contrary to DoD policy. Further, for more than 11 months, numerous DPS personnel engaged in domicile-to-duty transportation using DPS vehicles without obtaining the required Secretary of Defense approval. We notified the responsible DoD management officials regarding these matters.

This report includes recommendations to correct the deficiencies identified during the follow-on evaluation.

Management Comments. On April 18, 2003, we issued this report in draft form for management comments. We requested comments from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I));³ the Director, Administration and Management; and the General Counsel, DoD. USDI and the General Counsel concurred with our report. The Director, Administration and Management, concurred in part and nonconcurred in part. Most significantly, the Director disagreed that his operational practice allowing police officers to carry their service weapons to and from work and store them in their homes was contrary to DoD policy. The Director also disagreed with our assessment that the memorandum of understanding executed with the County Board of Arlington County, Virginia, might not be legally sufficient. Furthermore, although not specifically nonconcurring, the Director did not commit to amending the current policy that strongly encourages DPS police officers to intercede in certain civilian matters. For the reasons set forth in detail in this final report, we cannot accept the bases for the Director's nonconcurrences and unwillingness to commit to the further policy revisions needed. The Director should reconsider his positions on these issues based on the facts and considerations in this final report, and submit final management comments on this final report. We should receive these comments no later than April 30, 2004.

³ Subsequent to our draft report, a new organization, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), was established. ASD(C3I) is now part of USDI.